Why the Bolsa Família is not clientelistic (and what it might be instead) by Daïeff, Lorenzo
 
 
Chroniques des Amériques Volume 15, numéro 2, mars 2015 
 
Why the Bolsa Família is not clientelistic  
(and what it might be instead) 
Lorenzo Daieff
Abstract 
As conditional cash transfers (CCT) continue to 
expand throughout the world, some continue to 
wonder whether these programs are merely a 
legal new way of exchanging cash for votes, 
thereby undermining democratic competition 
and accountability. In Brazil in particular, many 
have accused the ‘Bolsa Família’ (BF), the 
world’s largest CCT and a flagship policy of the 
Workers’ Party (PT), of being clientelistic. This 
article, however, disputes this interpretation, in 
four steps. The first offers a theoretical 
discussion of the concept of clientelism. The 
second summarises the debate on the BF-
clientelism relationship as it has evolved in the 
literature, and shows that, despite early rallies to 
the accusations of clientelism, most scholars 
have come around to arguing that the BF is a 
programmatic policy. The third part draws on 
original data to show that the behaviour of 
actual BF-beneficiaries differs from those 
expected of ‘clients’, on the basis of 29 in-depth 
beneficiary interviews conducted in Recife 
(Pernambuco) in the summer of 2014. Finally, 
the last section points to the burgeoning 
literature on CCTs’ diffuse political effects, and 
calls for a research agenda that goes beyond the 
question of clientelism, to consider what kind of 
citizenship cash transfers promote. 
 
 
Résumé 
Alors que les transferts conditionnels en espèces 
(TCE) continuent de s’étendre à travers le 
monde, certains continuent à se demander si ces 
programmes sont simplement un nouveau 
moyen légal d'échanger des billets pour des 
votes, compromettant ainsi la compétition 
démocratique. Au Brésil en particulier, beaucoup 
ont accusé le «Bolsa Família» (BF), le plus grand 
TCE du monde et une politique clé du Parti des 
Travailleurs (PT), d'être clientéliste. Cet article, 
cependant, conteste cette interprétation, en 
quatre étapes. La première propose une 
discussion théorique de la notion de clientélisme. 
La seconde résume le débat sur la relation BF-
clientélisme tel qu'il a évolué dans la littérature, 
et démontre que, malgré un appui initial aux 
accusations de clientélisme, la plupart des 
auteurs ont finis par conclure que le BF est une 
politique dite ‘programmatique’. La troisième 
partie s’appuie sur de nouvelles données afin de 
montrer que le comportement de réels 
bénéficiaires du BF diffère de celui auquel on 
s’attendrait de la part de «clients», sur la base 
de 29 entretiens réalisées à Recife (Pernambouc) 
pendant l'été 2014. Enfin, la dernière section se 
réfère à une littérature en plein essor sur 
certains effets politiques plus diffus des TCE, et 
appelle à un agenda de recherche qui irait au-
delà de la question du clientélisme, et 
s’interrogerait sur le type de citoyenneté que les 
transferts monétaires promeuvent. 
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October 2006. President Luis Ignacio da Silva, a.k.a. Lula, is 
re-elected to the Brazilian presidency. Just a year prior, his 
party, the PT, had been mired in a legislative bribing scandal 
which many had expected to seriously tarnish the 
incumbent’s campaign. But whilst Lula lost votes in the 
South and Southeast, he more than compensated for it with 
rising support in the poorer North and Northeast, which had 
benefitted from the soc7ial policies under the PT’s first-ever 
stint in federal government. 
At the top of the list of these social programs features the 
flagship Bolsa Família (‘family grant’) conditional cash 
transfer program. Conditional cash transfers emerged in 
Brazil (at the state-level) and Mexico (at the federal level) in 
the 1990s, and have since spread across Latin America. They 
consist in direct-to-beneficiary cash transfers, usually on the 
basis of a program-specific debit card which allows 
withdrawals at government-bank ATMs. The monthly 
transfers are targeted at poor families, and conditioned on 
children’s regular school- and health-post attendance. In 
Brazil, a number of federal CCTs emerged under the 
government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1998-2002), but 
only really became a central policy instrument and priority 
under Lula’s government, which regrouped several minor 
programs into the Bolsa Família transfers, and significantly 
expanded their value and coverage. After 10 years of 
operation (2004-2014), Bolsa Família has established itself as 
the world’s largest CCT program, reaching around 14 million 
households, or 50 million people, or 25% of Brazil’s 
population. It currently (late 2014) provides between 77 and 
340 reais per month per family (~ US$40-170), depending on 
the number and age of children. The average actual transfer is 
R$167 (~ US$85),1 and represents roughly 50% of 
beneficiary households’ income (Nichter, 2014:133). 
                         
1 
http://www.mds.gov.br/saladeimprensa/noticias/2014/maio/
beneficios-do-bolsa-familia-tem-reajuste-de-10 (2014). 
The international reception to Bolsa Família (and CCTs more 
generally) has been overwhelmingly positive: various studies 
have attested to its positive impacts in broad poverty-related, 
educational and health terms (see Soares 2012 for an 
overview), as well as general good management and limited 
leakage and corruption (Sugiyama & Hunter, 2013). And yet, 
in this October of 2006, parts of the Brazilian electorate were 
furious at the program. In their eyes, the Bolsa Família was 
nothing but a massive, well-orchestrated vote-buying 
operation, used by Lula to shirk accountability for his poor 
governance. Using Southerners’ taxes, so the argument ran, 
Lula and the PT put part of the money in their pockets – as 
allegedly demonstrated by a 2005 corruption scandal, the 
Mensalão – whilst ‘doling out’ just enough of that state 
money to the poor illiterate masses of the Northeast to secure 
their vote. By buying the votes of those too disinterested or 
uninformed to know how truly ‘bad’ his government was, 
Lula seemingly recused himself from the accountability of 
the newspaper-reading Southern middle class, and could do 
almost anything in office as long as he continued to feed the 
mouths of starving families. The argument was not pretty; but 
to many it rang true, and the fact that the program was 
significantly expanded in the last 3 months before the election 
(Hall, 2008:813) seemingly vindicated its critics. Similar 
debates have surrounded the role of the Bolsa Família in the 
subsequent 2010 and 2014 polls; and at a recent conference 
on Latin American social policy I attended, the panel on 
CCTs rapidly turned into a discussion on the political (mis-
)use of policies like the Bolsa Família. 
In social science terms, the accusation is one of clientelism. 
Clientelism consists in the private exchange of benefits or 
favours, given out by a patron, for political support, provided 
by the client. This is usually thought to be contrary to the 
principles of democratic theory2: under clientelism, political 
competition is based on candidates’ resources, not ideas, and 
terrible candidates – patently corrupt ones, for instance – can 
                         
2 Clientelism is not restricted to democratic systems; indeed 
the term initially described dynamics in what social scientists 
used to refer to as ‘traditional’ societies. This paper, 
however, concentrates on democracies. 
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be (re-)elected if they can ‘buy’ enough support. This is 
usually contrasted with programmatic politics, where 
politicians convince citizens of their program (i.e. policies, 
proposals), or at least of their personal qualities that make 
them fit for public office. The difference is not always 
straightforward, however, and is less about the kinds of goods 
offered than about the way they are presented to citizens. A 
politician giving candy to Jack because he voted for her is 
running on a clientelistic platform; candy is her bargaining 
counter. A politician promising a program of free candy 
distribution to all is running on a programmatic platform; 
candy is her policy. 
The Bolsa Família is an example of the latter: it is a 
programmatic policy. However, it has often been (mis-
)interpreted as a clientelistic policy, as suggested above. This 
article attempts to clarify this debate, and explains why the 
Bolsa Família falls resolutely into the programmatic category. 
In doing so, it elaborates both on the concept of clientelism, 
and on the specific program. In terms of the concept, it 
assesses the Bolsa Família on the basis of two prominent 
frameworks in the literature, and shows that calling the BF 
clientelistic stretches the concept. This, however, may not 
convince those who either argue that the concept of 
clientelism should be stretched – because the BF constitutes a 
new form of clientelism, not accounted for by previous 
frameworks – or those who argue that, even if not technically 
‘clientelistic’, the BF still generated a class of devoted Lula-
voters who would support him no matter what, thereby 
undermining competition and accountability. Against this 
view, this article further shows that BF recipients do not 
behave and think like one would expect typical ‘clients’ to, 
and thus that the Bolsa Família cannot be said to have 
systematically ‘captured’ poor voters. Indeed, the program 
may have done quite the opposite: by extracting families from 
the direst poverty, it may have allowed them to break their 
ties with, and loyalties to, their established local patrons.  
The article proceeds in four parts, makes four contributions, 
and draws on four corresponding sources. The first part offers 
a theoretical discussion of the concept of clientelism as 
applied to the BF, and draws on two prominent, 
contemporary frameworks. The second part summarises the 
debate on the BF-clientelism relationship as it has evolved in 
the literature, and shows that, despite early rallies to the 
accusations of clientelism, most authors have come around to 
arguing that the BF is programmatic. The third part provides 
new, original data which shows that the behaviour of actual 
beneficiaries differs from those expected of ‘clients’, on the 
basis of 29 in-depth beneficiary interviews conducted in 
Recife (Pernambuco) in the summer of 2014. Finally, the last 
section draws on the burgeoning literature on CCTs’ more 
diffuse political effects, and calls for a research agenda that 
goes beyond the question of clientelism, to consider whether 
transfers can promote citizenship. 
The Concept: Programmatic 
Politics, Clientelism, and 
the BF 
How can we tell whether the BF is clientelistic? Clientelism 
has been defined in a number of ways over the years. One 
approach, which has enjoyed some popularity for being 
relatively straightforward, defines clientelism simply as "the 
exchange of political rights for social benefits" (Fox, 1990: 
153). That formula, however, will not do as a yardstick for 
the Bolsa Família, because it is simultaneously too lose and 
too narrow. It is too lose, because if ‘exchange’ is interpreted 
generously, then “it is difficult to distinguish what is specific 
to clientelism from most political bargaining more generally”, 
as Fox himself recognises (1994:153).3 It is, however, also 
too narrow, because if ‘exchange’ is interpreted strictly, then 
the Bolsa Família cannot possibly be clientelistic, since even 
critics will admit that the president does not actually 
‘exchange’ anything with beneficiaries. 
                         
3 In full, Fox notes: “Because analysts have found elements 
of clientelism in an extraordinarily wide range of hierarchical 
power relations, the usage can become so broad as to 
encompass almost any reciprocal exchange between actors 
of unequal power.” (ibid). 
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If the theoretical challenge is to have any value, it ought to 
start from a definition which gives at least some a priori 
credence to the idea that the BF may be clientelistic. The 
recent work of Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007) on clientelistic 
linkages is useful in this regard. At first sight, their 
description of the concept strikingly seems to encompass 
programs such as the Bolsa Família (emphasis added): 
“In many political systems citizen-politician 
linkages are based on direct material inducements 
targeted to individuals and small groups of citizens 
whom politicians know to be highly responsive to 
such side-payments and willing to surrender their 
vote for the right price. Democratic accountability in 
such a system does not result primarily from 
politicians’ success in delivering collective goods 
such as economic growth, jobs, monetary stability, 
or national health care, nor does it rest on improving 
overall distributive outcomes… Instead, clientelistic 
accountability represents a transaction, the direct 
exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct 
payments or continuing access to employment, 
goods, and services.” 
This is exactly the worry raised in the case of the Bolsa 
Família: that it consists in a targeted “material inducement” to 
the poor in the form of “direct payments” which guarantee to 
the government, if not the vote of every beneficiary, then 
enough of the national vote share that it need not concern 
itself with ‘economic growth’ or general good governance. 
That concern was particularly acute after 2006, when Lula’s 
re-election bid was expected to be routed by the ‘Mensalão’ 
scandal, before being seemingly rescued from any form of 
‘accountability’ by the accelerated rolling out of the Bolsa 
Família. Little wonder, in that context, that the program was 
accused of clientelism. 
As fitting as the above description may seem, however, a 
more detailed look into Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s framework 
reveals that ‘clientelism’ is not the right term to apply to the 
BF. This requires a little explanation. The authors broadly 
distinguish between ‘clientelistic’ and ‘programmatic’ party-
voter linkages (which they subdivide into programmatic 
‘policy’ competition, based on programs and issues, and 
programmatic ‘valence’ competition, based on governance 
and management skills). To distinguish the three linkage 
modes, they identify five key components of linkage theory: 
1. Contingency of the exchange (whether it hinges 
on the voter’s actions) 
2. Nature of the goods offered to voters 
(individual, collective, or ‘club’ goods) 
3. Predictability (how likely voters are to react to 
an inducement) 
4. Elasticity (how many votes can be gained for 
how many resources) 
5. Monitoring (the amount of information about 
voters needed) 
The following table, borrowed from Kitschelt & Wilkinson 
(p.21), summarises their typology: 
Table 1.1.  
The BF as a linkage mode on the right, table 1.1 illustrates 
the corresponding classification of the Bolsa Família, based 
on which of the three options on its left best describes the 
program. A brief explanation follows: 
1. Contingency: the BF benefit is not tied to a vote, 
since non-voters, and non-voting populations, are 
entitled to the benefit on an equal basis. Moreover, 
although the benefit is ‘targeted’, it is targeted to the 
poor, not to pro-government voters. 
2. Nature of the goods: the BF is a club good insofar 
as it is ‘excludable’ (not everybody receives it) but 
non-rival (my receiving does not prevent you from 
receiving it).4 What may be counterintuitive here is that 
the transfers themselves are, of course, eminently 
private goods; but what is evaluated here is the 
policy as a program, not the transfers. Doing 
otherwise would classify anything from social 
assistance to public pension funds as private goods, 
and thus under this scheme, as a clientelistic linkage. 
                         
4 This is true except at the margins, when the municipal 
quotas may be too small to fully account for the full amount 
of needy families, in which case the BF becomes rival for new 
entrants (cf. Kidd & Huda, 2013). 
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Yet as Stokes et al. (2013:12) note, “targeting 
individuals still constitutes programmatic politics”. 
3. Predictability: the likelihood that beneficiaries 
‘reciprocate’ is variable: potentially strong in the 
first (re-)election, and ever weaker thereafter (cf. 
Zucco, 2013, which we return to below). 
4. Elasticity: the BF has a relatively high elasticity, 
given its low cost, although like its predictability, it 
elasticity weakens in the long-term, getting closer to 
medium. 
5. Monitoring: there is no dedicated monitoring 
activity for the electoral effects of the Bolsa Família 
(beyond what can be deduced from routine electoral 
research), and certainly no external enforcement. 
The subtlety here is that one might consider the 
threat of the BF disappearing if the government 
changes as an ‘enforcement mechanism’, but this 
is neither technically true (since all parties 
pledge to continue the program), nor widely 
believed (as shown in the third section). 
As this illustrates, then, the BF shares certain elements with 
all three linkage modes. However, if it had to be classified 
under one heading, it would clearly be “Programmatic Policy 
Competition” (PP). The BF can be qualified as PP in all five 
categories, whereas it shares elements of “Programmatic 
Valence Competition” (PV) in three categories, and, 
strikingly, is only “Clientelistic” (CL) in two of them. Since 
the program is thus, by this framework, so far removed from 
being classified as clientelistic that it actually seems closer to 
a valence linkage (which, admittedly, is a little surprising), 
the above classification is likely robust to a change in any 
particular coding. Indeed, within this framework, the BF’s 
codings would require significant changes in more than half 
the categories for the program to be considered resolutely  
 
 
 
BOLSA FAMÍLIA 
NO 
(PV/PP) 
CLUB GOODS 
(PV/PP/CL) 
VARIABLE 
(PP) 
MEDIUM TO LARGE 
(PP/CL) 
NO 
(PV/PP) 
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clientelistic. 
One avenue left to the critic is to question the validity of 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s framework. The latter, certainly, is 
not the only way to define clientelistic linkages. Nevertheless 
– to reiterate some points made above – the typology is a 
sensible litmus test to classify the BF, since (a) it a priori 
seems to rank the program as clientelistic, and (b) it is a 
relatively recent and authoritative framework in the literature. 
Moreover, a brief look at another, even more recent and 
equally prominent typology only serves to confirm the BF’s 
unambiguous classification as programmatic and not 
clientelistic. 
In their recent work ‘Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism’, 
Stokes et al. (2013) provide a typology of programs and 
politics, which centres on the idea of ‘publicity’, that is, the 
public nature of a program. They draw a general distinction 
between, on the one hand, programs with an open, clear, and 
transparent set of rules, and on the other hand, political 
dealings which either leave enough discretion for their spirit 
to be betrayed, or which are altogether hidden, obscured, and 
indeed often illegal. CCTs are, so they argue, an eminent 
example of a programmatic policy with a clear set of 
guidelines and rules. Whilst the programs distribute 
individualised benefits, they are upfront about eligibility 
criteria and benefit structures, and can thus be understood, 
evaluated, and be voted up or down. Clientelistic dealings, by 
contrast, often occur in the shadows, with no publicly 
justified rationale, no guidelines, and no dedicated budget – 
meaning they are impossible to assess, support, or ban for the 
electorate. Thus, even if the intent of the Bolsa Família was 
indeed to ‘buy’ votes, the public nature of the program 
signifies, in the eyes of Stokes et al., that it is a programmatic 
policy. Programmatic policies are not necessarily good 
policies, of course – but they are fair game in a democracy.  
On theoretical grounds alone, then, the Bolsa Família hardly 
lives up to the definitions of ‘clientelism’, and cannot 
accurately be said to ‘buy votes’ without stretching the 
concept; after all, beneficiaries receive the transfers whether 
or not they voted for the party that introduced them, and the 
electorate as a whole has a clear idea of what the program is, 
and whether it wants to support it. However, most of the 
scholarly debate about the clientelism-BF relationship has 
been conducted in empirical, not theoretical terms, and has 
concentrated on the Bolsa Família’s actual effects. Although 
many scholars were initially critical of the program, the 
literature ultimately came around to arguing that the Bolsa 
Família had not generated an unalienable Lula ‘clientele’, as 
had initially been feared. The next section recapitulates and 
summarises the evolution of this debate. 
The Debate in the 
Literature: back and forth 
on the Bolsa Família 
In the literature, much like in the public realm, the debate 
around the (suspected) clientelistic nature of the BF emerged 
largely after Lula’s 2006 re-election, which witnessed a 
significant shift in Lula’s electoral base, from the wealthier 
South to the more impoverished Northeast. Because the NE 
was also the site of deepest BF-penetration, both the press 
and scholars were quick to suspect that the BF had benefited 
Lula, and that it may thus have been politically motivated. 
Three sub-debates consequently emerged: (a) Did the BF 
generate electoral gains for Lula? (b) Was the BF distributed 
according to need or political reasons? (c) How could one 
empirically distinguish between retrospective voting 
(perceived as legitimate) and clientelistic voting (seen as 
illegitimate)? 
Regarding (a), a number of early articles established that the 
BF had indeed bolstered Lula’s support in 2006 (Hunter & 
Power, 2007; Soares and Terron 2008; Zucco, 2008). As 
Bohn (2013:26) notes, this finding was initially framed as 
evidence for macro-clientelism: 
“The higher likelihood that BF beneficiaries would 
vote for Lula is said to be a “response by voters to 
direct cash handouts from the government” (Zucco 
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2008, 35), transforming the 2006 presidential 
reelection into “yet another unfolding of the old 
story of using the government to build clientelistic 
support” (Hunter and Power 2007, 9).” 
By 2013, however, the conclusions to be drawn from those 
electoral gains had become less clear, since the debate had 
advanced on count (b): using a variety of different 
techniques, a number of authors showed that the distribution 
of the Bolsa mapped objective “need” closely, at least in 
geographic terms (Fenwick, 2009; Rodrigues-Silveira, 2011; 
Fried, 2012).5 Indeed, Fried (2012:1042) notes that he found 
“… little evidence that political criteria explain the difference 
between the number of poor families that live in a 
municipality and the number of families that receive 
support.” Although the election may have incentivized the 
government to accelerate the rolling out of the BF (Hall, 
2008:806), the match between need and BF disbursements 
suggests that these increases ultimately only served to 
incorporate into the BF program those who indeed had a right 
to the transfer. 
Given (b) – the BF seems to be administered according to 
need – the debate shifted to (c): how clientelistic and 
programmatic voting might be distinguished. One way to do 
this is akin to the theoretical discussion of the previous 
section, which concluded that the term ‘clientelism’ was not 
appropriate because there was no implicit threat to be cut off 
from the program if one did not vote for Lula. Even so, this 
leaves open the question of why citizens voted for the 
incumbent. Was it, as some critics suggest, a personal thank-
you note to Lula for the extra cash they personally enjoyed 
every month? (which does not constitute a direct exchange, 
but is akin to reciprocating for a private favour). Or was it a 
vote of support for his general political agenda? 
These may be difficult to distinguish, because it is easier to 
know how people voted than why they did so – and in any 
                         
5 The BF is also well targeted in material terms, as even 
critics admit: “Bolsa Família is not only the largest but also 
the best targeted CCT scheme in Latin America, with 73 per 
cent of benefits reaching the poorest 20 per cent of the 
population, and 94 per cent falling within the lowest two 
quintiles (FAO, 2006).” (Hall, 2008:807). 
case, many program beneficiaries did indeed vote for Lula in 
2006. There are, however, a number of empirical strategies to 
tell these alternatives apart. A first one would be to note that 
support of the BF largely exceeds the ranks of recipients: for 
instance, after the 2010 election, 86% of respondents to a 
nationally representative survey approved specifically of the 
BF (Ames et al., 2010), suggesting that it is considered a 
sound program beyond the circles of those who benefit from 
it directly. 
A more intricate way, suggested by Zucco (2013), is to 
investigate whether the electoral gain from the BF endures 
across elections (which would indicate a stable clientele), or 
whether it fades over time (which would suggest standard 
retrospective voting). As Zucco shows, the latter is the case in 
Brazil: the electoral reward for the BF peaked and then 
elided, which he interprets as evidence for a good policy 
obtaining a one-off reward, as opposed to a continuous vote-
buying mechanism. Though Zucco had himself formerly 
criticised the BF for buying votes (cf. Zucco, 2008),6 he 
ultimately concludes that “there is evidence that CCTs have 
not created ‘partisan clienteles’… In this context, CCTs do 
not seem like a tool with which to build overall political 
dominance” (p.820). Similarly, when De Figueiredo and 
Hidalgo (2010:1) used survey and experimental evidence 
from Recife, they found that “Bolsa Família, while generating 
support for President Lula, has not altered the partisan 
allegiances of low income voters in Brazil”. 
To sum up, although the BF did indeed generate substantial 
electoral support, it did so as a “programmatic policy” (Fried, 
2012:1042). This view is confirmed by various other authors, 
including by research on another major CCT program, 
Mexico’s Oportunidades: 
“… findings are difficult to reconcile with the notion 
that the electoral effects of CCTs are a result of 
prospective concerns triggered by threats of program 
discontinuation or endogenous program enrolment. 
Instead, the evidence in this article suggests that 
CCTs’ mobilizing effects are compatible with 
programmatic politics” (De la O, 2013:1). 
                         
6 Zucco had previously written, “Bolsa Família is a […] way to 
‘buy’ votes” (Zucco 2008:48). 
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“These [Brazilian and Mexican CCT] programs are 
of course not apolitical in the broader sense; in fact, 
their success has been a boon to the political 
fortunes of those responsible for them… However, 
the political rewards for these programs are those of 
programmatic politics, not clientelism.” (Weitz-
Shapiro, 2014:73) 
“Even though Bolsa Família has generated 
substantial electoral returns for President Lula and 
the PT, the program cannot be considered an 
instance of clientelism, for the selection of 
beneficiaries is based on universalistic criteria 
(mainly per capita income).” (Borges, 2011:31) 
Ultimately, as The Economist summarized in 2008, “Bolsa 
Família is sometimes equated with straightforward vote-
buying. That is unfair”.7 
Qualitative Evidence: 
Interviews with 
Beneficiaries 
In addition to the above literature, in-depth interviews I 
conducted with BF-beneficiaries shine further light on the 
relationship between the Bolsa Família and clientelism. 
Although relatively few in numbers (29) and limited to select 
neighbourhoods of Recife (Pernambuco), their semi-
structured conversational nature allowed for the exploration 
of how beneficiaries interpreted the Bolsa Família. Although 
a variety of opinions was expressed on any given topic, the 
general picture that emerged from the discussions further 
confirms the findings from the previous section. 
Regarding clientelism, three themes explored during the 
interviews were relevant: 
a) beliefs about the normative status of the program 
(whether it is a citizens’ right, or a favour from the 
government) 
b) beliefs about the future of the program (whether and 
how it might end) 
c) voting patterns (whom people voted for and how 
they decided that) 
                         
7 http://www.economist.com/node/10650663, retrieved 
online 17/01/2014. 
Presumably, the archetypical ‘client’ of the Bolsa Família, so 
often invoked by the Brazilian media, would (a) perceive the 
program as a favour or gift, (b) believe that the program 
would end if the PT lost power, and (c) would thus vote for 
Lula/Dilma, and do so specifically because of the BF. 
As it turned out, although each of these separate views was 
occasionally voiced throughout the interviews, none of the 
interviewees expressed all of them. Instead, the majority 
expressed an interesting mixture of attitudes, which, although 
uneven, did not generally justify identifying them as ‘clients’ 
of the program. In summary, the responses to the three items 
were as follows: 
a) When asked whether the BF was a right or a 
favour of the government, the vast majority of 
respondents answered that it was a right of 
theirs.8 Elaborating, some pointed to a duty of the 
state to help those in need, and/or noted that they 
paid taxes, and thus had a right to obtain something 
in return (“it’s a right, I think it’s a right of the 
people, because it’s our taxes, the taxes the people 
pay, so this money is due to us. The country has an 
obligation to give this money to who needs it, to 
who doesn’t have...”, 18/2). Admittedly, it was not 
always obvious with what notion of the term ‘right’ 
respondents were operating; but overall, very few 
actually described the BF as a favour.9 
                         
8 There is a genuine debate about what constitutes the 
‘actually correct’ answer on this matter. The BF remains, to 
this day, a program set up by a ‘mere’ law (i.e. neither a 
constitutional nor even an organic law). The program, then, 
is technically not a right. It is not even an entitlement, 
because, as some authors have noted, municipal quotas for 
the program mean that not all of those who are eligible for 
the program are actually registered (cf. Kidd & Huda, 2013). 
Nonetheless, civil society groups and BF officials tend to 
insist that they advertise the program as a right, reminding 
beneficiaries that they owe nothing to anybody in exchange 
for the benefit, which is duly theirs. Moreover, politically, if 
citizens believe the program is a right, then the cost to any 
politician trying to deny them the BF would be so high that 
the actual legal status may not matter. 
9 This goes against the claim of Cristovam Buarque (2006), a 
Brazilian Senator, who claims that Bolsa Família “has become 
a vote-buying scheme… a program with a strong electoral 
appeal since it is seen as aid without counterpart, a kindness 
received from the government” (cited from Nichter, 
2014:323). As the fieldwork revealed, few beneficiaries 
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b) Respondents were also asked if they thought the 
program might disappear if the government changed, 
a salient question not only because of the upcoming 
general elections that year (2014), but also because 
the incumbent president and Lula’s successor, Dilma 
Rousseff, had (wrongly) claimed in her campaign 
that some of her rivals would abolish the program. 
Interviewees’ answers here were divided. On the one 
hand, nearly half rejected the idea that the BF would 
disappear, explaining either that (i) it had already 
survived a change of president (“One [government] 
already got out, and another came in…”, 10/10), or 
that (ii) the people would revolt if it disappeared (“It 
would lead to a nuclear war, wouldn’t it?” 15/5), or 
yet that (iii) every sensible politician knew they 
would lose votes by cutting the program (“they need 
votes. If they [cut] this they will totally lose the 
electorate”, 22/6).10 On the other hand, quite a few 
confessed that it ‘may’ disappear (“They shouldn’t 
change it, see? But it might well happen”, 6/6), or 
that they were not really sure, but that there were 
certainly ‘rumours’: “I have heard that they 
[politicians] will cut it, that the program will 
disappear. But then others say that they won’t cut it. 
So I don’t know” (23/7). It is worth noting that this 
uncertainty does not necessarily benefit the 
incumbent; some were so unsure about what would 
happen that they were not even sure whether Dilma 
Rousseff herself would continue the BF (“if Dilma 
wins, I don’t know if she’ll continue [the program], 
and if it’s another, I also don’t know what will 
happen”, 27/7).11 Overall, only few respondents 
                                           
ultimately see the Bolsa Família as a ‘kindness’ from the 
government. 
10 Some might see exactly that as the proof that the Bolsa 
Família is clientelistic. However, that seriously distorts the 
concept of clientelism, applying it to any policy that gathers 
votes, and thus seemingly merging the concept with that of 
programmatic politics. Politicians would lose votes if they cut 
health care, too, but that in itself does not make public 
health care clientelistic. 
11 Those who expressed such uncertainty usually justified it 
by saying things such as ‘I don’t know anything about 
‘political’ things’ (1/1). This may reflect ignorance, but also 
explicitly thought that Dilma was the only candidate 
who would retain the program.12 
 
c) When asked directly whether they identified with 
any party or candidate, most beneficiaries said they 
did not; those few who indicated a preference chose 
Dilma/the PT as often as not. If anything, exactly 
half the respondents said they would not vote if they 
did not have to.13  Asked how they decided whom to 
vote for, a majority generally referred to the idea of 
choosing the best candidate (e.g., “Analysing… I go 
around looking… Listening… To choose that 
candidate who will change the country”, 16/6). 
Others said they take advice from neighbours and 
family, trust local politicians they know, or just vote 
blank. 
Overall, then, the Bolsa Família does not seem to have 
allowed the PT to constitute itself a ‘clientele’ amongst 
beneficiaries (if ever that had been its intention), or not in 
urban areas anyway. As the summary in Table 1.2 shows, 
respondents did not, in general, behave like the archetypical 
‘BF client’. 
                                           
the feeling that politicians are unpredictable, unaccountable, 
and do whatever they want, leaving the people to suffer the 
consequences (good or bad). 
12 The ‘technically correct’ answer, given candidates’ 
campaign promises in the run-up to the 2014 election, is that 
all of the main candidates would have retained the program. 
Allegations that opponents would do away with the program 
were rife, especially on the part of Dilma Rousseff, but whilst 
they suggest a political use of the program, they do not 
make it clientelistic. 
13 Voting is a legal obligation in Brazil. Interestingly, one 
interviewee linked her obligation to vote to the Bolsa Família: 
“I have [an obligation to vote], you see, because of the Bolsa 
Família” (7/7). Even then, she seemed to see it more as a 
condition of the program – like bringing your children to 
school – than as a moral obligation to reward anybody 
specific (Lula/Dilma/the PT) with her vote. Indeed, when 
asked, she did not identify with any party or candidate. 
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However, a ‘standard’ beneficiary could also not be 
identified: respondents displayed a variety of views, and 
combined them in different ways. In that sense, the numbers 
in the table should not be read as exact estimates, since they 
hide a sea of ambiguities, half-starts, hesitations, and 
contradictions in beneficiaries’ views and responses. Thus, 
although most interviewees did not act and speak like BF 
clients, some did indeed display attitudes that may make 
critics of the BF suspicious. For example, Lula did indeed 
attract significant praise in the interviews, sometimes 
specifically for the BF: 
“Many people thank him, Lula, for having started 
this program, because it helped the people quite a 
bit” (17/1). 
“For me [the BF] was optimal, because I had no 
benefit... after getting into [the program], it helped 
me quite a bit... I thank God and Lula... I know that 
for me it is fantastic. Now Lula... he was the person 
that I always want to vote for... if he runs ten times, I 
would vote for him 10 times... I voted for Dilma 
because of him” (13/3). 
Respondent 13/3 was also one of the few to see the BF as a 
gift (“I think it is a gift”), and said she did not know whether 
the program would continue if the president changed (“It 
depends on each [candidate], whether [the BF] continues, 
or… I don’t know. But it would be good, to continue…”). 
Since she promises to ‘always vote for Lula’ and carried her 
vote over to Dilma, she seems the perfect example of a PT 
partisan ‘captured through cash’, an image that haunts part of 
Brazilian society, which fears masses of BF recipients 
reliably delivering votes, no matter how corrupt or 
incompetent the government.  
In 13/3’s case, that may be true, although she stands out as an 
exception. Whilst many others praised Lula, the laudatios 
often stressed his poor origins more than the BF.14 More 
importantly still, this praise only semi-transferred to Dilma. 
Take respondent 23/7, who on the one hand declared, “the 
president I really liked was Lula”, but on the other hand 
expressed criticism of Dilma, whom she does not credit for 
the BF: “many people aren’t liking much of her [Dilma’s] 
work, you know? Because she came in, this program already 
existed, it wasn’t her”. Others were similarly critical: 
                         
14 For instance, and touchingly, 23/7 said: “I say the 
president I really liked was Lula. He changed, really changed 
[things]. But it’s because he was born of the people, really. 
He’s from the people. He’s from us, from here in 
Pernambuco. One day I would like to meet with him, shake 
his hand, tell him, you [‘cara’], my brother, you... you 
changed us, the life of many people. It was him, really... he 
changed things.” 
Table 1.2 – Comparing ‘client’ and ‘actual’ responses 
*different totals are due to missing responses for some questions 
Question 
Expected response 
of archetypical BF 
client 
Actual responses of BF beneficiaries 
Do you see the BF as a right or a favour? A favour 
A right: 16/22 (73%) 
 Gift/favour/help: 6/22 
Do you think the BF might disappear if the 
government changes? 
Yes 
No: 8/20 
Maybe/not sure: 11/20 
Yes: 1 person 
Do you support or identify with any 
candidate or party? 
Dilma / the ‘PT’ 
Dilma / PT: 4/29 
Campos / Marina: 5/29 
No affiliation: 20/29 
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“The BF wasn’t Dilma, it already existed...” (26/10) 
“Dilma, I won’t vote for her this year. Because 
Dilma says things are getting better... but no. 
Because Dilma, she already spent all this time in 
power. Is it that the people don’t know what Dilma 
did? They know. The people aren’t stupid. Now you 
vote for her if you want.” (27/7) 
“She [Dilma] isn’t doing much for Brazil…” (18/2) 
This, incidentally, mirrors Zucco’s (2008) findings cited 
above: CCTs can lead to a spike in support, which then ebbs 
with time and presidents. What emerges from the interviews 
is thus not entirely surprising: as is well known, Dilma 
obtained a ‘sympathy boost’ in 2010, as the handpicked 
successor of the popular Lula. However, she subsequently 
started being judged on her own performance, as one might 
expect from responsive voters. The result, at least in the 
neighbourhoods surveyed, was clearly not a set of devoted 
PT-partisans. 
Ultimately, then, the quantitative and qualitative evidence 
converge toward a programmatic interpretation of conditional 
cash transfer programs. Although some – like 13/3 – may 
now be devoted PT voters because of the BF, beneficiaries in 
general do not seem to (a) see the BF as a favour, (b) think 
only Dilma will retain the program, or even (c) intend to vote 
for Dilma. Instead, many seem to remain responsive to actual 
performance in office, which suggests programmatic/ 
retrospective voting. Indeed, in a recent book, Rachel Weitz-
Shapiro comes to the same conclusion: 
“By most accounts, Mexican and Brazilian 
beneficiaries access these programs based on need, 
understand these resources are funded by the state, 
and they do not believe that their continued access to 
benefits is linked to individual political behaviour.” 
(2014:73) 
Future research avenues: 
the BF, clientelism, and 
citizenship 
To conclude and reiterate the main point of this paper, calling 
the Bolsa Família ‘clientelistic’, accusing it of buying votes, 
or lamenting that it undermines competition and 
accountability are all undue charges against the program, 
which rest on a misunderstanding both of the concept of 
clientelism, and of the actual effects of the program. 
Theoretical frameworks, quantitative evidence from the 
literature, and qualitative evidence from recent fieldwork all 
converge towards this conclusion. 
This is not to say that the program – and conditional cash 
transfers more generally – do not interact with clientelism in 
interesting, if perhaps unexpected, ways. This final section 
offers two alternative, possible relationships, but it first 
briefly delves deeper into the mechanisms of clientelism. 
As explained above, clear, coherent, and rule-bound national 
programmes like the Bolsa Família do not fit the category of 
‘clientelism’. Indeed, ‘clientelism’ is rarely steered from the 
centre, but relies on an army of local ‘brokers’, who contact, 
reward, and monitor voters. Although these brokers may fit 
into national political structures and have links to the top, 
their activities are also eminently local, and rely on an 
intimate acquaintance with citizens in their area (Auyero, 
2001; Stokes et al., 2013). The Bolsa Família may affect this 
relationship between brokers and voters in at least two ways. 
On the one hand, if brokers manage to get their hand on the 
cash transfers, control registration, or even just hold back the 
documents needed to register (such as proofs of residency, 
distributed by often politicised neighbourhood associations), 
then brokers can act as gatekeepers to the program, and 
ensure it is only distributed to those who vote their way. The 
risk, then, is that the BF may be (ab)used by local elites as a 
source of patronage, thereby reinforcing pre-existing 
clientelistic networks. Note the blame here is not on the 
federal instigators of the program, but rather on the 
unfortunate misappropriation of funds at the local level. After 
all, “It would certainly not be the first time in Brazil’s history 
that federal government transfers were turned into grist for 
patronage at sub-national levels” (Hunter & Sugiyama, 
2009:13). 
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Fortunately, Wendy Hunter and Natasha Sugiyama (2009; 
2013) have studied the question, and found that beneficiaries 
do not perceive the BF as an instrument of clientelism. 
Although beneficiaries in focus groups were happy to report 
widespread clientelism and vote-buying in general, they were 
explicit that (i) enrolment in the BF was not political; that (ii) 
no mayor/council person had offered them help with the sign-
up; and that (iii) the transfer was a right, and that politicians 
could thus not remove it. Their conclusion (which my own 
fieldwork corroborates) is, accordingly, encouraging: 
“In sum, we found consistent evidence that the Bolsa 
Família provides tangible benefits to the poor 
without subjecting them to manipulation by local 
political patrons or arguably even to concerns of 
such a prospect occurring” (ibid, p.30).15 
On the other hand, the Bolsa Família’s cash injections may do 
quite the opposite; namely, undermine the relationship 
between local patrons and poor citizens, by loosening the grip 
the former have over the latter. Now that the family receives 
a regular income, often for the first time ever, it may be less 
dependent on the assistance of local brokers, many of whom 
were previously able to gain easy votes in exchange for 
meagre food or monetary assistance. Conditional cash 
transfers, then, may free citizens from voting with their 
stomachs, and empower them to make true use of their 
political rights. In this spirit, in an interview with the Folha de 
Sao Paulo published in June 2013, Brazilian sociologist 
Walquiria Rego suggests that the ‘colonel’ – the local patron 
– has lost weight: 
“The colonel lost weight because she [the BF 
beneficiary] acquired a liberty she didn’t have. She 
does not need to go to the mayor [anymore]. She can 
ask for a better street, but not food, which was the 
way coronelism functioned.” 16   
This possibility has so far been hardly explored by scholarly 
research. In a forthcoming work, I argue that conditional cash 
transfers have indeed affected the relationship between voters 
                         
15 A survey reported in “Whither Clientelism” (Sugiyama & 
Hunter, 2013) corroborates these findings. 
16 Folha de São Paulo, 11th of June 2013, “O Bolsa Família 
enfraquece o coronelismo”. 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/06/1293113-
bolsa-familia-enfraquece-o-coronelismo-e-rompe-cultura-da-
resignacao-diz-sociologa.shtml  
and their local patrons (and have weakened the latter), 
although they have not single-handedly eliminated 
clientelism, partly because they have not – unsurprisingly – 
eradicated poverty and basic needs. 
From the point of view of the general literature, the modest 
lesson to be drawn from this article is that the research 
agenda on the political consequences of conditional cash 
transfers should be re-oriented and extended. Re-oriented, 
away from the idea that CCTs like the Bolsa Família 
constitute or strengthen clientelism, and extended, towards 
the possibility that transfers may actually undermine local 
patronage networks, and thus contribute to the emergence of 
a new or at least strengthened citizenship, understood not 
only as the existence of rights, but as their realization and 
exercise on one’s own terms. After all, if ‘programmatic 
politics’ is one antonym of clientelism, ‘citizenship’ is 
another: as Escobar (2002:23) argues, “citizenship and 
clientelism are fundamentally incompatible”, because the 
rights that constitute citizenship are sold, not exercised, under 
clientelism. 
The idea that ‘policies make citizens’, and that the design of 
social assistance shapes broad patterns of political 
participation, is not, of course, new (Campbell 2003; Soss 
1999). However, it is in the early days of being applied to 
conditional cash transfers and the Bolsa Família. Although 
the government-sponsored edited volume to celebrate the 
program’s ten years was titled ‘Programa Bolsa Família: uma 
década de inclusão e cidadania’ (‘Bolsa Família: Ten Years 
of Citizenship and Inclusion’), it actually spent little time 
considering the issue of citizenship. Rego and Pinzani (2013) 
are more explicit in their analysis, and argue that the BF has 
been transformative for the lives of the poorest (and 
especially women), but critics retort that the program’s 
unparticipative and individualised nature threatens to 
fragment communities and create a culture of dependence 
(Martins, 2004). In the same vein, Attanasio et al. (2009) use 
experimental evidence to show that CCTs increase inter-
personal trust, but Chong et al. (2009) use much the same 
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methods to show the opposite; and whilst Schober (2013) and 
Rodriguez Chamussy (2011) carefully suggest that Mexican 
CCTs have encouraged broader political participation, 
Auyero (2012) tells dark tales of the deleterious effects of the 
Argentine welfare state on the poor (to my knowledge, no 
equivalent studies exist for Brazil). 
These debates are a start, but they deserve to be taken further. 
Having long ago ascertained the economic effectiveness of 
CCT programs, another push in the research agenda is now 
needed to understand their diffuse effects on the relationship 
between beneficiaries and the state, beneficiaries and society, 
and beneficiaries and their own communities. We now know 
the BF is not clientelistic – but can it be a force for 
citizenship? If it is, then under what conditions, and what 
exactly does it promote? What will be the long-term 
consequences? If it is not, then are the economic gains worth 
the losses in local trust and solidarity, or in collective agency? 
Alternatively, can the programs be made more participative, 
should they, and to what effect? It is time to understand 
whether and how CCTs can contribute to the “difficult 
transition from clientelism to citizenship” (Fox, 1994) so 
urgently required in Latin America.17 
                         
17 For one vibrant attempt to understand these ‘diffuse 
effects’, interested readers can turn to the special ‘ten years 
of the Bolsa Família’ edition of POLÍTICA & TRABALHO, 
Revista de Ciências Sociais, n. 38, April 2013. Not all articles 
therein directly engage the notion of citizenship, but their 
(usually ethnographic) attempt to grasp the subtle 
symbolical and cultural implications of the Bolsa Família – 
particularly if not exclusively in terms of gender and 
community – are an encouraging and stimulating example of 
this new research agenda. 
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